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DIRECTOR

LINCOLN

PRIORITY

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TO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

SUBJ: PBSUCCESS

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1. REQUEST FOR BROAD AUTHORITY WAS PREDICATED ON OUR DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO PROPERLY DIRECT FIELD OPERATIONS ON TIMELY BASIS WITHOUT NECESSITY REVIEWING EVERY VARIATION WITH HEADQUARTERS WHICH OCCURS WHEN PIECEMEAL AUTHORITY EXISTS. PERHAPS IN EFFORT TO CONSCIENTIOUSLY AVOID BY YOUR LIMITED AUTHORITY WE HAVE LOST WHAT MAY PROVE TO BE PRECIOUS HOURS EACH TIME NEW CIRCUMSTANCES DEVELOPED.

2. UPON EXAMINATION YOUR CONCEPT OF AIR POWER WE FIED NO BASIC DIFFERENCE IN SUBSTANCE OR OBJECTIVE ONLY PERHAPS TERMINOLOGY WHICH IS NOT ESSENTIAL WHEN FOREGOING FACTORS ARE IN AGREEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE WE SAY "A STRICTLY MILITARY TYPE SITUATION HAS MATERIALIZED." MEANING, HAVING TRIED AND FAILED THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MEANS WE ARE NOW CONFRONTED WITH MILITARY SITUATION WHEREIN WE MUST ATTEMPT DEFECTION OF ARMY THROUGH FORCE OF ARMS. THUS WE FELT OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY MUST BE EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM. AS LAST RESORT.

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3. WE ENJOIN YOU TO RECONSIDER POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THREE FIGHTER A/C MANNED BY BATTLE PROVEN [] PILOTS. ON PRO-RATA BASIS, NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS TO NUMBER OF A/C, COMPARED TO OTHER MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS, WE BELIEVE RATIO ONE A/C TO TWO THOUSAND GROUNDED TROOPS IS VERY FAVORABLE. FURTHERMORE IT IS INCONCEIVABLE ENTIRE ARMY WOULD REQUIRE SUBMISSION BEFORE LARGE SCALE DEFECTIONS OCCURRED.

4. USING DEFECTION OF ARMY AS OUR AGREED OBJECTIVE THEN IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL EFFORT MUST BE DEVOTED TO THIS PURPOSE ALONE WHICH FALLS INTO CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

A. STRATEGIC: TARGETS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SERIOUS DISLOCATION TO ENEMY AND ALTHOUGH NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE WOULD SOON IMPAIR HIS COMBAT CAPABILITY, I.E., FUEL STORAGE AND AMMO DUMPS, INTERDICTION, ETC.

B. TACTICAL: CONCENTRATION OF AIR POWER ON ENEMY'S MAIN POINT OF RESISTANCE IN A SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT SUCH AS [...]

5. POLITICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGETS SUCH [] RACETRACK, ETC. ARE NOT CONSIDERED WORTHWHILE NOR AS PRODUCTIVE AS COMPARED TO FIRST WINNING THE BATTLE OF [] AND ESTABLISHING DECISIVE MILITARY POSTURE. PRESENT THOUGHT IS THAT [] TARGETS MENTIONED WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE THUS NOT CONTEMPLATED IN PRESENT PLANNING.

6. BEFORE ATTEMPTING FORWARD PROJECTION OF OUR CONCEPT WE MUST STATE THAT PRESENT ENGAGEMENT AT [] IS SERIOUSLY REGARDED AS PLACE OF DECISION. SUCCESS WOULD MOST CERTAINLY SHAKE ARBENZ'S CONFIDENCE IN HIS ARMY AND ALTER ENTIRE SITUATION JUST AS FAILURE AND SUBSEQUENT ROUTING OF FRIENDLY FORCES WOULD REQUIRE COMPLETELY NEW EXAMINATION OF SITUATION AT THAT TIME.

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7. VIEW ABOVE, WE WOULD PREFER AT THIS MOMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON
TO MORROW'S BATTLE AND ADVISE YOU SOONEST OF ANY ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED DEPENDING UPON DEVELOPMENTS. MEANWHILE WE WILL
PROCEED WITH OUR PLANNING AND SELECTION OF OTHER TARGETS SHOULD SITUATION
REQUIRE THEM.

END OF MESSAGE